The paper deals with the functional safety of distributed control systems following the component-based approach. A control component is classically defined as a software unit allowing the control of a physical process. When a fault occurs in the plant, the system should be reconfigured dynamically to be adapted by adding-removing or updating software components for the safety of the controlled physical processes. An agent-based architecture is proposed therefore to control the plant's evolution before applying any possible reconfiguration scenario of the system. When the system is distributed on networked controllers, we propose a control agent for each device but we need also a coordination agent to allow safety distributed reconfigurations. The unique coordinator uses well-defined matrices and a protocol for this coordination. We model the whole architecture by using ordinary Petri nets and apply SESA for the verification of CTL properties of the system. The paper's contribution is applied to two benchmark production systems at
INTRODUCTION
In (SZYPERSKI et al., 2002) , the author gives the following definition for a Component: "A software component is a unit of composition with contractually specified interfaces and explicit context dependencies only. A software component can be deployed independently and is subject to composition by third parts". New generations of componentbased technologies have recently gained popularity in industrial software engineering since it is possible to reuse already developed and deployed software components from rich libraries. Besides, the embedded Component-based technology is largely used in industry. We find many applied technologies in industrial systems such as Koala (van Ommering et al., 2000) , Function Block (Diedrich and all, 2004) , . . . Each one technology has to reduce the time to market and to meet extra-functional properties (the most important ones are real-time properties and resource consumption) (Goessler et al., 2007) . As we need to study a distributed control architecture, the MultiAgent System appears as an attractive solution in this domain (Jennings et al., 1998) . Various kinds of communication strategies can be found in (Wittig, 1992) . Some are based on broadcasting of messages, others on the existence of a central communication agent.
The objective of our work is to ensure a safety control of distributed systems with the verification of some requirements to test its reliability. These control systems require some correction to respect especially functional and temporal constraints. To achieve this goal, our methodology is based on three essential steps:
1. The description of functional behavior in order to study the system in more details;
trol Agent to each device and a Coordinator Agent to ensure a right interaction between the different Control Agents. Our main interest is how to model with Petri nets the whole architecture and how to check that all devices behave correctly after each reconfiguration scenario. In fact, we want to be sure that each applied reconfiguration in a device does not affect the behavor of remote devices. To do so, we define the communication protocol between Control Agents and Coordination Agent. We specify the communication protocol with the Net Condition/Event System. To be sure that the specification is correct, we use the model checker SESA to verify some properties. Finally, we implement the communication protocol through the "ProtocolReconf" tool developed with the Qt language. Our current work is based on our previous published papers, but we study the problem of verification of protocol as well as the implementation of simualtor.
The next section presents the background i.e. the set of articles published related to our study. We define in Section 3 a multi-agent architecture and the communication protocol to ensure safety in a distributed control systems. The Section 4 presents the model checking of the communication protocol. The section 5 introduces the "ProtocolReconf" tool to simulate the communication protocol. We finally conclude the paper in the last section.
BACKGROUND
Until now, we have published a set of previous papers dealing with reconfigurable control systems. We define in ) the concept of Control Components as generic independent components of any component-based technology. The Control Component (abbr. CC ) defined as an event-triggered software unit composed of an interface for any external interactions and an implementation allowing control actions of physical processes. A control system is assumed to be a composition of components with precedence constraints to control the plant according to well-defined execution orders.
We define in ) a new software architecture for intelligent agents to control and adapt systems to their environments. This Control Agent reacts as soon as an error occurs in the plant. The decision taken may vary from changing the set of Control Components that constitute the system, modifying the connection between different Control Components, substituting the behavior of some Control Component by another behavior or even modifying data. According to these functionalities, it is possible to define the architecture of the agent as based on four levels: (i) First level: (Architecture Unit) this unit checks the plant evolution and changes the system's software architecture (adds/removes Control Components) when particular conditions are satisfied, (ii) Second level: (Control Unit) for a particular loaded software architecture, this unit checks the plant's evolution and reconfigures compositions of corresponding Control Components, (iii) Third level: (Implementation Unit) for a particular composition of Control Components, this unit reconfigures their implementations, (iv) Fourth level: (Data Unit) this unit updates data if particular conditions are satisfied. To verify the correctness of its behavior, we specify the whole architecture according to the formalism Net Condition/Event Systems which is an extension of Petri Nets. To avoid the combinatory explosion, we apply in (Gharbi et al., 2010b) a refinement-based approach to verify step by step subsets of components. We study in (Gharbi et al., 2011b ) the fault management by intelligent agents.
To guarantee correct and feasible distributed reconfigurations, we define in (Gharbi et al., 2010a) an inter-agents communication protocol. To ensure the interaction between Control Agents, we define the communication protocol. For that reason, we define a Coordination agent having a set of matrices named 'Coordination matrix' which indicates for each Control Agent the reconfiguration to apply. In fact, whenever an error occurs, the corresponding Control Agent sends a request to the Coordination agent to apply a new reconfiguration. The Coordination agent informs the other Control Agents concerned by this modification to preserve the system in a safe state. Our contributions are applied to two benchmark production systems at Martin Luther University in Germany. The first benchmark production system FESTO is composed of three units: Distribution, Test and Processing units. We assume that there are two drilling machines Drill machine1 and Drill machine2 to drill pieces. Three production modes of FESTO are considered according to the rate of input pieces denoted by number pieces into the system : High production, Medium production and Light production.
The second Benchmark Production System EnAS (Website: http://at.iw.unihalle.de/forschung/enas demo) transports pieces from production systems to storing units. The pieces shall be placed inside tins to be closed with caps. Two different production strategies are assumed to be applied : we place in each tin one or two pieces according to production rates of pieces, tins and caps. The EnAS system is mainly composed of a belt, two Jack stations (J 1 and J 2 ) and two Gripper stations (G 1 and G 2 ). According to production parameters, we distinguish two cases : First production policy and second production policy. More details describing the benchmark production systems can be obtained in our previous articles.
In (Gharbi et al., 2011a) , we have studied a centralized system controlled by an intelligent software agent manipulating faults. However, in this work we want to extend this study by considering a distributed system controlled by several agents interacting together through a communication protocol. We continue our research by proposing the model checking of communication protocol to prove its correctness in order to be sure that any applied reconfiguration in a device does not affect the correct execution of the rest of devices. We want also to check the correct behavior of Coordinator Agent for a correct coordination between devices.
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
We define a multi-agent architecture for distributed safety systems. Each control agent is affected in this architecture to a device of the execution environment to ensure safety. It is specified by nested state machines that support all reconfiguration forms. Nevertheless, the coordination between agents in this distributed architecture is extremely mandatory because any uncontrolled automatic reconfiguration applied in a device can lead to critical problems, serious disturbances or also inadequate distributed behaviors in others. To guarantee safe distributed reconfigurations, we define the concept of Coordination Matrix that defines correct reconfiguration scenarios to be applied simultaneously in distributed devices and we define the concept of Coordination Agent that handles coordination matrices to coordinate between distributed agents. We propose a communication protocol between agents to manage concurrent distributed reconfiguration scenarios.
Running Example. When a hardware problem occurs at run-time in a platform, a reconfiguration of the other is required as follows:
• We are interested to ensure Safety to a set of Software Control Components to be distributed on networks of devices where a coordination between agents is necessary because any uncontrolled automatic reconfiguration applied by any agent as a result to error occuring in a specific device can lead to serious disturbances in others. We define in this section the concept of Coordination Matrix to handle coherent reconfiguration scenarios in distributed devices and we propose thereafter an architecture of multiagent distributed safety systems where a communication protocol between agents is defined to guarantee safe behaviors after any distributed reconfigurations.
Distributed Reconfigurations
Let Sys be a distributed reconfigurable system of n devices, and let Ag 1 ,..., Ag n be n agents to handle automatic distributed reconfiguration scenarios of these devices. 
According to this definition: If an agent Ag a applies the reconfiguration scenario Recon f iguration a CM [a,1] ,CM [a,2] ,CM [a,3] ,CM [a,4] , Then each other agent Ag b (b ∈ [1, n]\{a}) has to apply the scenario Recon f iguration b CM [b,1] ,CM [b,2] ,CM [b,3] ,CM [b,4] (Figure  1 ). We denote in the following by idle agent each agent Ag b (b ∈ [1, n]) which is not required to apply any reconfiguration when others perform scenarios defined in CM. In this case: [a,3] ,CM [a,4] = True We denote in addition by ξ(Sys) the set of coordination matrices to be considered for the reconfiguration of the distributed system Sys. Each Coordination Matrix CM is applied at run-time if for each agent Ag a (a ∈ [1, n]) the following conditions are satisfied: [a,4] = True On the other hand, we define Concurrent Coordination Matrices, CM 1 and CM 2 two matrices of ξ(Sys) that allow different reconfigurations of same agents as follows: ∃b ∈ [1, n] such that:
In this case, the agent Ag b is disturbed because it has to apply different reconfiguration scenarios at the same time. To guarantee a deterministic behavior when Concurrent Coordination Matrices are required to be simultaneously applied, we define priority levels for them such that only the matrix with the highest priority level should be applied. We denote in the following by:
• Concur(CM) the set of concurrent matrices of CM ∈ ξ(Sys), • level(CM) the priority level of the matrix CM in the set Concur(CM) ∪ {CM}.
Running Example. For the sake of simplicity, we take as example only two matrices CM 2 and CM 6 (in (Gharbi et al., 2010a ) the reader will find more details on all possible coordination matrices).
• 
Coordination between Distributed Agents
We propose a multi-agent architecture for control systems following the Standard IEC61499 to handle automatic distributed reconfigurations of devices. [b,2] ,CM [b,3] ,CM [b,4] CM [b,1] ,CM [b,2] ,CM [b,3] ,CM [b,4] [b,2] ,CM [b,3] ,CM [b,4] ).
• If CA(ξ(Sys)) receives positive answers from all Control Agents, Then it authorizes reconfigurations in the concerned devices:
Else If CA(ξ(Sys)) receives a negative answer from a particular Control Agent, Then CA(ξ(Sys)) permits Ag a , on the one hand, to apply the requested reconfiguration scenario by sending the following reply: [a,2] ,CM [a,3] ,CM [a,4] ). CA(ξ(Sys)) informs the other Control Agent Ag b , on the other hand, to cancel the new reconfiguration.
For each
Ag b , b ∈ [1, n] and CM[b, i] = 0, ∀ i ∈ [1, 4], cancel(Recon f iguration b CM[b,1],CM[b,2],CM[b,3],CM[b,4] ) in device b .
Running Example. In our FESTO and EnAS Benchmark Production Systems, we show in Figure 2 the coordination between these Control Agents when Jack1 is broken in EnAS. In this case, the Coordination Agent uses the Matrix CM to decrease the productivity in FESTO.

MODEL CHECKING OF COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
To verify some properties, the use of Model-Checker SESA is well justified. In fact, it offers a wide range of functionalities. At first, the NCES formalism is an extension of the Petri Net. Secondly, it permits to represent concurrent process. Thirdly, there are several tools associated to NCES enabling the generation of reachability graph, the verification of some properties, Finally, the verification of some properties using the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) (Roch, 2000) with the model checker SESA.
EnAS agent FESTO agent Coordination agent
Request (EnAS, CA, Reconfiguration 1,2,0,0 ) Reconfiguration (CA, FESTO, Reconfiguration 1,1,1,1 ) 
Jack1 is broken
Drill station D1 is OK Possible_reconf (FESTO, CA, Reconfiguration 1,1,1,1) Apply (Reconfiguration 1,2,0,0) Apply (Reconfiguration 1,1,1,1 In this section, we aim to specify and verify the Communication Protocol through the NCES editor and the model checker SESA. This is the real contribution of this paper which is based on related previous published papers. In the Communication Protocol, we distinguish three kinds of participating agents:
• The Control Agent i : it is the Control Agent which starts the communication. In fact, whenever an error occurs in a specific plant, the associate Control Agent tries to correct it and if it decides the necessity of reconfiguration the whole system (i.e. the other Control Agents must be aware of this modification) it informs the Coordination agent.
• The Coordination agent (CA): it is the main agent which has as task the coordination between the different Control Agents. Thus, when the coordination agent receives the request of reconfiguration, it searches the list of Control Agents which must be informed. It sends a request to these Control Agents and waits the response from them.
• The Control Agent j : it is the j th Control Agent that receives a request from Coordination agent for reconfiguration. Firstly, it checks the possibility to apply a reconfiguration. If it is possible, it sends a positive answer. If it is not possible, it sends a negative answer (see Figure 3) . For further information, we refer to Table 1 .
CTL Properties
The following CTL properties are proven to be true by the model checker SESA: Property 1. Always, when an error occurs in the plant, the Control Agent i informs the Coordination Agent. AG (P2 => EF P9) This property is proven to be true by SESA tool.
Property 2. During the negotiation, the Coordination Agent waits the response from the other agents The Control Agent i decides a new reconfiguration
The Control Agent i informs the coordination agent
The Control Agent i receives a negative answer from the coordination agent
The Control Agent i applies the new reconfiguration
The Control Agent i receives a positive answer from the coordination agent
The Control Agent i applies the new reconfiguration with the other
The end of communication process
The Coordination Agent receives a request
The Coordination Agent sends to other agents
The Coordination Agent receives a positive answer from a specific agent
The Coordination Agent receives a positive answer from all concerned agents
The Coordination Agent asks the other agents to apply a new reconfiguration
The Coordination Agent waits (either positive or negative) response from the other agents
the Coordination Agent ( Figure 5 ), it is necessary to define the set of Coordination Matrices and especially the current matrix to apply to the whole system. Running Example. In FESTO and EnAS Benchmark Production Systems (Figure 6 ), we assume that the matrix CM 2 is applied i.e. the FESTO's agent applies the High Production mode and the EnAS's agent applies the Second Production strategy. To verify the interaction between these agents when a particular hardware problem occurs, we change the state of the device Driller1 which becomes broken. Consequently, the FESTO's agent should decrease the production by sending a request to the Coordination Agent in order to look for the most convenient matrix which is CM 6 . The Coordination Agent sends a request to decrease the production in EnAS. The EnAS's agent studies the feasibility of this new reconfiguration in order to accept the decrease of production. In this case, the Coordination Agent sends a final confirmation to officially apply this new coordination matrix.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper deals with the Model Checking of distributed safety control systems by following a multi- agent architecture. We define an agent-based architecture where each agent (associated to a defined device) controls the environment evolution and applies automatic reconfigurations when hardware errors occur at run-time to guarantee a functional safety of the whole system. Each control agent is affected in this architecture to a device of the execution environment to ensure safety. Besides, the Coordination Agent is responsible for the interaction between Control Agents in order to ensure a mutual agreement with the others on a reconfiguration to apply. We present therefore a communication protocol between these agents using Coordination Matrix specifying for each Control Agent the reconfiguration to apply according to predefined conditions. The model checking is very interesting method to prove the correctness of the communication protocol represented with the NCES. Finally, the "ProtocolReconf" tool is used to simulate the communication protocol.
In the future work, we plan to study the failure recovery functionality realized by the Control Agent in order to provide the corrective measures to avoid the failures due to hardware or software default. We aim to study also the functionality covering the acquisition of data from and the forwarding of commands (through the sensors and the actuators) to the physical plant ensured by the Control Agent.
